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Abstract: Growth is pro-poor if the poverty measure of interest falls. According to this 
definition there are three potential sources of pro-poor growth: (a) a high rate of growth 
of average incomes; (b) a high sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes; and 
(c) a poverty-reducing pattern of growth in relative incomes. This paper empirically 
decomposes changes in poverty in a large sample of developing countries during the 
1980s and 1990s into these three components. In the medium to long run, most of the 
variation in changes in poverty can be attributed to growth in average incomes, 
suggesting that policies and institutions that promote broad-based growth should be 
central to the pro-poor growth agenda. Most of the remainder of the variation in poverty 
is due to poverty-reducing patterns of growth in relative incomes, rather than differences 
in the sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes. Cross-country evidence 
provides relatively little guidance as to the policies and institutions that promote these 
other sources of pro-poor growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  In the past few years, the term “pro-poor growth” has become pervasive in 
discussions of development policy.  Despite the widespread use of the term, there 
appears to be much less consensus as to what exactly pro-poor growth means, let alone 
what its determinants are.  According to one view, growth is pro-poor if the 
accompanying change in income distribution by itself reduces poverty (Kakwani and 
Pernia 2000). However, this definition is rather restrictive, as it implies that, for example, 
China’s very rapid growth and dramatic poverty reduction during the 1980s and 1990s 
was not pro-poor because the poor gained relatively less than the non-poor.  A broader 
and more intuitive definition is that growth is pro-poor if the poverty measure of interest 
falls.  Ravallion and Chen (2003) propose this definition and apply it to a particular 
poverty measure, the Watts index. 
 
In this paper, I adopt the broader definition, and then apply standard poverty 
decomposition techniques to identify three potential sources of pro-poor growth:  (a) a 
high rate of growth of average incomes;  (b) a high sensitivity of poverty to growth in 
average incomes; and (c) a poverty-reducing pattern of growth in relative incomes.  I 
implement this decomposition for several poverty measures, using household survey 
data for a large sample of countries in the 1980s and the 1990s.  I then use variance 
decompositions to summarize the relative importance of these sources of pro-poor 
growth. Finally, I investigate the correlates of the sources of pro-poor growth in a large 
panel of observations on changes in poverty. 
 
The main results of this paper are the following.  First, regarding the relative 
importance of the three potential sources of pro-poor growth, I find that roughly half of 
the variation in short-run changes in poverty can be explained by growth in average 
incomes.  In the medium to long run, between 66 and 90 percent of the variation in 
changes in poverty can be accounted for by growth in average incomes.  Virtually all of 
the remainder is due to changes in relative incomes.  In contrast, cross-country 
differences in the sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes account for very 
little of the variation in changes in poverty.     
  2
Second, I find some evidence that growth in average household survey incomes 
is correlated with several of the usual determinants of growth from the empirical growth 
literature, including institutional quality, openness to international trade, and size of 
government.  Although the evidence documented here for the correlates of growth in 
household survey incomes is not especially compelling, I argue that this likely reflects 
the limited country coverage and presence of measurement error in the household 
survey data on which this paper is based.   
 
Third, I find relatively little evidence that poverty-reducing patterns of growth in 
relative incomes are significantly correlated with a set of explanatory variables that the 
empirical growth literature has identified as significant determinants of growth in per 
capita GDP.  The same is true for a number of other variables, that while not generally 
significant for growth, have been suggested in the literature as potentially reducing 
inequality.  
 
  Taken together, these results underscore the importance of growth in average 
incomes for poverty reduction.  This in turn suggests that a policy package focusing on 
known determinants of growth in average incomes, such as the protection of property 
rights, stable macroeconomic policies and openness to international trade should be at 
the heart of pro-poor growth strategies.  Moreover, the absence of compelling evidence 
that these factors are systematically correlated with the changes in income distribution 
that matter most for poverty reduction suggests that there are no obvious tradeoffs – 
policies that lead to growth in average incomes are unlikely to systematically result in 
adverse effects on poverty through their effects on relative incomes. 
 
  This does not mean that growth in average incomes is sufficient for poverty 
reduction.  Rather, the results presented here suggest that cross-country evidence is 
unlikely to be very informative about the policies and institutions that are likely to lead to 
poverty-reducing patterns of growth in relative incomes.  This suggests that more micro-
level and case-study research may be useful in shedding light on the determinants of 
poverty-reducing distributional change. 
 
  This paper is related to a growing empirical literature on growth, inequality, and 
poverty.  Most immediately, this paper builds on Dollar and Kraay (2002).  In that paper,  3
we defined the poor as those in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, and 
empirically investigated the determinants of growth in incomes of the poorest quintile.  In 
a large panel of countries, we found that growth in incomes of the poor tracked growth in 
average incomes roughly one-for-one.  Since the growth rate of average incomes of the 
poor is just the sum of the growth rate of average incomes and the growth rate of the 
first quintile share, our paper showed that neither average incomes, nor a large set of 
other control variables, were significantly correlated with changes in the first quintile 
share.  That paper contributed to a growing literature on the determinants of inequality, 
including Li, Squire and Zhou (1998), Gallup, Radelet and Warner (1998), Spilimbergo, 
Londono and Szekely (1999), Leamer, Maul, Rodriguez and Schott (1999), Easterly 
(1999), Barro (2000), Foster and Szekely (2001), and Lundberg and Squire (2003).   
 
  This paper differs from Dollar and Kraay (2002), as well as much of the existing 
literature on determinants of inequality, in two key respects.  First, instead of looking at 
relative poverty measures or inequality, here I focus primarily on changes in absolute 
poverty measures as the dependent variable.
1  As is well understood, changes in 
absolute poverty measures are complicated and non-linear functions of underlying 
changes in average income and income distributions.
2  The second contribution of this 
paper is to empirically construct the exact measures of distributional change that matter 
for changes in poverty for a large sample of countries, rather than simply looking at 
common summary statistics of inequality such as the Gini coefficient or quintile shares.  
This means that I can empirically study the contributions of growth and distributional 
change to changes in poverty, without having to make restrictive assumptions about the 
shape of the underlying income distribution.
3  
 
  Despite these differences, the main conclusions of this paper are similar to those 
in Dollar and Kraay (2002).  In particular, both papers find that growth in average 
incomes matters a great deal for reductions in both relative and absolute poverty.  Both 
                                                  
1 A notable early exception is Ravallion and Chen (1997), who estimate regressions of changes in 
absolute poverty on changes in mean incomes using a panel of household surveys from 
developing countries. 
2 See for example Bourguignon (1999) for a lognormal example. 
3 For example, Lopez (2003) investigates the determinants of growth and change in the Gini 
coefficient, and then draws conclusions regarding the likely effects on poverty by assuming that 
the distribution of income is lognormal, so that there is a one-to-one mapping between the Gini 
coefficient and the Lorenz curve.  4
papers also find little evidence that common determinants of growth, as well as a 
number of other variables, are robustly correlated with patterns of distributional change 
that matter for poverty reduction.  
  
  The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews standard poverty 
decomposition techniques and uses them to illustrate the channels through which growth 
and distributional change matter for changes in a number of poverty measures.  Section 
3 describes the dataset of changes in poverty in a large sample of developing countries 
on which the empirical analysis is based.  Section 4 provides evidence on the relative 
importance of the sources of pro-poor growth, as well as evidence on some of the 
correlates of these sources.  Section 5 concludes.  5
2.  Empirical Framework 
 
In this section I use standard techniques to decompose the change in poverty 
into three components:  (a) growth in average incomes; (b) the sensitivity of poverty to 
changes in average incomes; and (c) changes in relative incomes.  Let yt(p) denote the 
income of the p
th percentile of the income distribution at time t.  This can be written as a 
function of average income, µt, and the Lorenz curve, Lt(p), i.e. 
dp
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poverty index.  Another possibility is a broader social welfare function without a 
discontinuity at the poverty line, such as Atkinson’s (1970) equally-distributed equivalent 
income (EDEI).  In this case    ()
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1
t P  is the poverty measure 
of interest. 
 
  Next, we can differentiate this poverty measure with respect to time to get:
4 
 
                                                  
4 Differentiating under the integral sign in Equation (1) requires the application of Leibnitz’s rule.  
Note that the term involving the derivative of the upper limit of integration is zero, since the 
poverty measures are zero when evaluated at the incomes of those at the poverty line.  For EDEI 
both the upper and lower limits of integration are constant and so the derivative simply passes 
through the integral sign.  6









Equation (2) tells us that the rate of change in the poverty measure is the average 
across all percentiles of the income distribution of the growth rate of each percentile 
multiplied by the sensitivity of the poverty measure to growth in that percentile.  In 
particular,  ) p ( y
) p ( dy
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t ⋅ ≡ η   is the semi-elasticity of the poverty measure with 
respect to the income of the p
th percentile.   This term captures the effect on poverty of a 
small change in incomes of individuals at the p
th percentile of the income distribution.  
This sensitivity is multiplied by 
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t ⋅ ≡ , which captures the growth rate of 
incomes at each percentile of the income distribution.  Ravallion and Chen (2003) refer 
to this function as the “growth incidence curve”.   The overall change in poverty then 
consists of the average across all percentiles of the product of these two terms.  
 
  In order to separate out the effects of growth in average incomes, we can re-write 
Equation (2) by adding and subtracting average growth to get: 
 















































Equation (3) identifies the three sources of pro-poor growth that we have been 
discussing: (a) growth in average incomes; (b) the sensitivity of poverty to growth in 
average incomes; and (c) growth in relative incomes.   The first term in Equation (3) 
captures the first two sources of pro-poor growth.  It consists of growth in average 













, multiplied by a term summarizing the sensitivity of the poverty 
measure to changes in average incomes, ∫ ⋅ η
1
0
t dp ) p ( .   This sensitivity is simply the 
average across all percentiles of the sensitivity of poverty to growth in each percentile of 
the income distribution.  The second term in Equation (3) captures the remaining source 
of pro-poor growth:  changes in relative incomes.  In particular, this third source of pro- 7
pooor growth is the average across all percentiles of the income distribution of the 
product of (a) the growth rate of income in the p
th percentile relative to average income 
growth, and (b) the sensitivity of poverty to growth in that percentile.  For example, if the 
poverty measure of interest is very sensitive to growth among the poorest, and if the 
income of the poorest grows faster than average incomes, then poverty will fall. 
 
  Equation (3) is useful for thinking about the various definitions and sources of 
pro-poor growth.  For example, the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) definition of pro-poor 
growth states that growth is pro-poor if and only if the second term in Equation (3) is 
negative, i.e. the pattern of growth in relative incomes is such that the poverty measure 
falls.  A broader definition of pro-poor growth suggested by Ravallion and Chen (2003) is 
that growth is pro-poor if the poverty measure of interest falls.  According to this 
definition, there are three potential sources of pro-poor growth:  (a) rapid growth in 
average incomes; (b) a high sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes; and (c) 
a poverty-reducing pattern of growth in relative incomes.   
 
In the empirical section of this paper, I will use data on income distributions and 
average incomes for a large sample of developing countries to construct these three 
sources of pro-poor growth, document their relative importance, and investigate their 
determinants.  Before doing so, however, it is useful to examine the key ingredients in 
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and the function summarizing the sensitivity of poverty to growth in each percentile, 
ηt(p).   
 
Figure 1 graphs two examples of the pattern of growth in relative incomes, for 
China over the period 1990-1998, and for Indonesia over the period 1996-1999.  In 
China, according to the household survey average incomes grew at 14 percent per year, 
and the dollar-a-day headcount measure of poverty fell from 51 percent to 33 percent of 
the population.   However, there was also a sharp increase in inequality during this 
period, with the Gini coefficient rising from 34 to 40.  The pattern of relative income 
growth rates shown in the relative growth incidence curve highlights this pattern of 
increased inequality.  Growth in the poorest 80 percentiles of the population was below 
average growth, while the richest 20 percent of the population saw above-average  8
growth.  In Indonesia, survey mean income fell dramatically between 1996 and 1999 at 
nearly 9 percent per year as a result of the East Asian financial crisis.  Yet during this 
period, the pattern of growth in relative incomes was poverty-reducing.  Inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient fell from 36.5 to 31.5.  The relative growth incidence 
curve is downward sloping, indicating that incomes of the richer percentiles of the 
income distribution fell faster than incomes of poorer percentiles.  In fact, below-average 
growth was recorded only for the richest 20 percent of the population.  Despite this pro-
poor pattern of relative income growth, the headcount measure of poverty increased 
from 8 percent to 13 percent of the population, driven by the large negative growth 
effect.  
 
Consider next the sensitivity of the poverty measure to growth in different 
percentiles of the income distribution.  In the case of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class, 
() ( )
1
t t t z / ) p ( y 1 z / ) p ( y ) p (
− θ − ⋅ ⋅ θ − = η  up to the headcount, and zero afterward. For the 
Watts index,  1 ) p ( t − = η  up to the headcount, and zero afterward. Finally, for EDEI, we 
have 
θ ⋅ θ − = η ) p ( y ) p ( t t .  Note that these sensitivies depend not only on the poverty 
measure of interest, but also on the entire distribution of income as summarized by yt(p).   
Figure 2 graphs these sensitivities, using the actual distribution of income in China in 
1990 as an example, to show how different poverty measures are sensitive to growth in 
different percentiles of the income distribution.   
 
In the case of the headcount, this sensitivity is zero everywhere except just below 
the poverty line where it spikes down to minus infinity.  This is because the headcount 
simply adds up the number of people below the poverty line – small increases in income 
of inframarginal poor people that do not bring them above the poverty line will not reduce 
the headcount.  The same is true for increases in incomes of those above the poverty 
line, including the “near-poor” just above the poverty line.  The case of the headcount 
already illustrates the broader point of Figure 2:  whether a given pattern of growth is 
pro-poor or not depends crucially on the poverty measure of interest.  In particular, if pro-
poor growth in the sense of reducing the headcount measure of poverty is the objective, 
then a pro-poor growth strategy should focus exclusively on raising the incomes of those 
just at the poverty line, and should ignore everyone else.     
  9
This strong and slightly absurd conclusion is in part driven by the choice of the 
headcount as the poverty measure of interest.  Consider next the poverty gap and the 
squared poverty gap.  The poverty gap is most sensitive to growth in incomes of those at 
the poverty line, but is also sensitive to growth in incomes of everyone below the poverty 
line.  The intuition for this is the following:  the poverty gap reflects a social welfare 
function which is indifferent to the distribution of income among poor people.  In this 
case a given rate of average growth results in a larger absolute increase in income for a 
person near the poverty line, and so the poverty measure is most sensitive to those 
nearest the poverty line, but is non-zero for all poor people.   
 
The squared poverty gap is also sensitive to growth in the incomes of all those 
below the poverty line, but the sensitivity is now U-shaped.  Growth in incomes of the 
richest and poorest of those below the poverty line matters least, and the squared 
poverty gap is most sensitive to growth in incomes of poor people somewhere in 
between these two extremes.  The intuition for this again depends on the underlying 
social welfare function, which now values  absolute transfers from richer to poorer poor 
people.  This however is offset by the fact that a given average growth rate results in a 
larger absolute increase in income for richer poor people.  This is why the sensitivity of 
the poverty measure to growth is a non-monotonic function of the income percentile.   
 
The Watts index has the property that it is equally sensitive to growth in all 
percentiles below the poverty line. This is why Ravallion and Chen (2003) argue that a 
good measure of pro-poor growth is the average (across all percentiles) growth rate of 
those below the poverty line, i.e. the average growth rate of incomes of the poor.  In this 
paper I go further and decompose the average growth rate of incomes of the poor into 
growth in average incomes and the average growth rate of the poor relative to growth in 
average incomes.  This allows me to distinguish between the effects of growth in 
average incomes and growth in relative incomes on the Watts measure, and all the other 
measures considered here.  This distinction is not trivial, as we will see in the empirical 
section of the paper that there is more evidence for the correlates of growth in average 
incomes than growth in relative incomes. 
 
Finally, when inequality aversion is positive, i.e. θ<1, the EDEI measure is most 
sensitive to growth in incomes of the poorest, but is non-zero for all income percentiles.    10
The key difference with the other poverty measures is that there is no longer a 
discontinuity at the poverty line – growth in all parts of the income distribution matters for 
poverty reduction, with growth among the poorest mattering most. 
 
To reiterate, the important point of Figure 2 is that poverty measures differ in their 
sensitivity to growth in different percentiles of the income distribution.  As a result, a 
given pattern of relative income growth might be pro-poor (in the sense that the poverty 
measure falls) for some poverty measures, but not for others.  Moreover, if we take 
seriously the objective of pro-poor growth with respect to a particular poverty measure, 
then this requires a growth strategy focusing on particular parts of the income 
distribution.  For example, pro-poor growth with respect to the headcount requires an 
emphasis on those just below the headcount, while pro-poor growth with respect to EDEI 
with strong inequality-aversion requires interventions targetted to reaching the poorest of 
the poor.    
 
Finally consider the average across all percentiles of  the sensitivity ηt(p) of 
poverty to growth in incomes of percentile p.   Recall from Equation (3) that this average 
sensitivity measures the effect of growth in average incomes on the poverty measure.  
We have been referring to high values of this average sensitivity of poverty to growth in 
average incomes as one of the three potential sources of pro-poor growth.  For the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty measures, this average sensitivity can be 
expressed in terms of the poverty measure itself when θ is not equal to zero,   
() ) 1 ( P ) ( P dp ) p ( t t
1
0
t − θ − θ − = ⋅ η ∫ , where Pt(θ) denotes the FGT measure with parameter θ.
5   
In the case  where θ is zero, the sensitivity of the headcount to growth in average 
incomes is: 
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− = ⋅ η ∫  which can be expressed as the slope of the density 
of income at the poverty line.  For the Watts measure, the average elasticity is simply 
minus one times the headcount.  For EDEI, the sensitivity to average growth is EDEI 
itself, implying that the elasticity of EDEI with respect to growth in average incomes is 
one.  While these results are useful for analytically characterizing the sensitivity of the 
different poverty measures to growth in average incomes, we will see shortly that cross-
                                                  
5 This result can be found in Kakwani (1993).   11
country differences in the sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes are not 
empirically very important, in the sense that they explain little of the cross-country 
variation in the first term in Equation (3).  We therefore do not discuss them further here. 
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3.  Data 
 
  The objective of the rest of this paper is to use the analytic framework discussed 
above to decompose observed changes in poverty into the three terms discussed above:  
(a) growth in average incomes; (b) the sensitivity of poverty to growth in average 
incomes; and (c) changes in relative incomes.  After constructing these three terms for a 
large sample of developing countries, I use them to identify the relative importance of, 
and factors correlated with, these various sources of pro-poor growth. 
 
I use household survey data on average incomes and 10 points on the Lorenz curve 
for a large number of surveys, as compiled by Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen at 
the World Bank.  Their data come directly from primary sources, have been meticulously 
cleaned, and are available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor .
6  
Depending on the country, the surveys measure either the distribution of income or the 
distribution of consumption.  Average income or consumption is measured in 1993 
dollars and is adjusted for cross-country differences in purchasing power parity.  Since I 
am interested in changes in poverty over time, I take only countries with at least two 
household surveys.  This results in a total of 285 surveys covering 80 developing 
countries.  Most of the survey dates are in the 1990s, with some countries extending 
back to the 1980s.  I use the World Bank’s “dollar-a-day” poverty line, which in 1993 
dollars is $1.08 per day, or $393 per year. 
 
Using these surveys, I construct two datasets of spells of changes in poverty.  In the 
first dataset, I consider all possible spells for each country, discarding only those few 
cases where the survey changes from an income to an expenditure survey or vice versa.  
This results in 205 spells of poverty changes.  The length of these spells is quite short, 
averaging 3.5 years and ranging from one to 13 years.  In order to be able to look at 
changes over longer horizons, I also construct a dataset consisting of one spell per 
country, where the initial and final years are chosen so as to maximize the length of the 
spell given available data.  This results in a set of 80 spells, with an average length of 
8.2 years, and ranging from two to 19 years.  Finally I eliminate all spells where the 
headcount measure of poverty is negligible in either the initial or final period, i.e. below 2 
                                                  
6 I am grateful to Shaohua Chen for kindly providing key data from all of the household surveys, 
including some that are not available on the poverty monitoring website.  13
percent, and I also drop a number of spells where the average annual growth rate in the 
survey mean is implausibly large, i.e. more than 15 percent in absolute value.  This 
reduces the first dataset to 128 spells covering 58 countries with an average length of 
3.5 years, and the second dataset to 42 spells with an average length of 9.6 years.  
 
In order to construct the poverty measures and their decompositions discussed in 
the previous section, I need the full Lorenz curve and not just the 10 points provided in 
the Ravallion-Chen data.  To obtain this, I assume that the Lorenz curve has the 
following functional form: 
 
(4)  () 1 , 1 0 , 0 , ) p 1 ( 1 p ) p ( L ≥ γ ≤ β < ≥ α − − ⋅ =
γ β α  
 
This particular parameterization is a member of a family of ordered Lorenz curves 
proposed by Sarabia, Castillo, and Slottje (1999).  I estimate the parameters of this 
Lorenz curve for each survey using an algorithm suggested by the same authors.  This 
involves selecting all possible combinations of three points on the Lorenz curve, and 
then for each combination finding values of α, β, and γ such that the Lorenz curve 
passes through these three points.  The final estimates of α, β, and γ are then found by 
averaging across all the resulting estimates of these parameters, discarding those for 
which the parameter restrictions indicated in Equation (4) that are required for the 
Lorenz curve to have positive first and second derivatives do not hold.  I then obtain the 
quantile function by analytically differentiating the Lorenz curve and multiplying by 
average income.  Using this, I can immediately construct ηt(p) for each poverty measure 
of interest, as well as the growth incidence curve over the observed discrete interval,  
1
) p ( y
) p ( y









4.  Results 
 
  I begin by constructing the poverty measures of interest (the headcount, the 
poverty gap, the squared poverty gap, the Watts index) for the initial and final years of 
each spell.  I then compute average annual changes in these measures, normalizing 
each by its initial value so as to get proportionate changes that are more easily 
comparable across poverty measures.  Table 1 reports the simple correlations of the 
levels and average annual growth rates in these poverty  measures with the 
corresponding log-levels and growth rates of survey mean income.  These simple 
correlations are all negative, and are large in absolute value, especially those in levels 
and those for the long spells.  Figure 3 graphs the proportional change in each poverty 
measure against the growth rate of average incomes, using the sample of long spells.  In 
each case, there is a strong and highly significant negative relationship between 
changes in poverty and changes in average incomes.  There is somewhat more 
dispersion around this average relationship for the more bottom-sensitive poverty 
measures such as the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap, than for the headcount 
measure.  However, this may simply reflect the greater sensitivity of bottom-sensitive 
poverty measures to measurement error in individual incomes, as I argue in more detail 
below.   
 
Table 1 and Figure 3 confirm the widely-understood empirical regularity that 
poverty measures tend to fall as average incomes increase. The rest of this section 
documents the relative importance of the different sources of pro-poor growth discussed 
above, and some evidence on the correlates of growth in average and relative incomes. 
 
Relative Importance of Sources of Pro-Poor Growth 
 
  I now document the relative importance of the three sources of pro-poor growth 
that we have been discussing.  I do this in two steps.  I first decompose the change in 
poverty in each spell into a “growth component” and a “distribution component” using the 
decomposition suggested by Datt and Ravallion (1992), which is the discrete-time 
analog of Equation (3).  Let  () t t L , P µ  denote a poverty measure based on mean income 
at time t, µt, and the Lorenz curve at time t, Lt.  I then write the proportional change in the 
poverty measure over the discrete interval between time t and t-1 as:  15
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The first term on the right-had side is the growth component of the change in poverty, 
and is constructed as the proportional difference between the initial poverty measure 
and a hypothetical poverty measure computed using the second period mean but the 
first period Lorenz curve.  The second term is the distribution component which is 
computed as the proportional difference between the initial poverty measure and a 
hypothetical poverty measure constructed using the first period mean but the second 
period Lorenz curve.  These two components are the discrete-time analogs of the two 
terms in Equation (3).  Unlike Equation (3), however, there is also a residual term 
because the decomposition is done over a discrete and not an infinitesmal interval.  I 
measure the proportional changes on the left- and right-hand side of Equation (5) as log 
differences and normalize by the length of the interval to get average annual percent 
changes in poverty and its growth and distribution components for each spell. 
 
  Tables 2 and 3 report the results of applying this decomposition to the two 
datasets of spells.  Throughout these two tables, I use the following variance 
decomposition to summarize the relative importance of the various components.  If X 
and Y are two correlated random variables, then I define the share of the variance of 
X+Y due to variation in X as 
) Y , X ( COV 2 ) Y ( VAR ) X ( VAR




7  The top panel of each 
table documents the importance of the residual relative to the sum of the growth and 
distribution components of the change in poverty.   The first column shows the variance 
of the sum of the growth and distribution components, the second column the variance 
of the residual, and the third the covariance between the two.  The final column reports 
the share of the variance of changes in poverty due to the growth and distribution 
components, which is virtually one for all poverty measures.  This simply reflects the fact 
that the variance of the residual term is tiny relative to the variance in measured changes 
in poverty.  This can also be verified visually from the top panel of Figure 4, which 
                                                  
7 When X and Y are normally distributed, this variance decomposition has a very natural 
interpretation.  It tells us how much the conditional expectation of X increases for each unit that 
we observe the sum (X+Y) to be above its mean value.   16
graphs the change in poverty on the horizontal axis, and the sum of the growth and 
distribution components on the vertical axis, using the dataset of long spells.  The slope 
of the OLS regression line is the share of the variance in poverty changes due to the 
growth and distribution components, and one minus the slope is the share due to the 
residual term.  It is clear from this graph that changes in poverty are largely accounted 
for by the sum of the growth and distribution components, with very little of the variation 
due to the residual. 
 
  The middle panel of Tables 2 and 3 does the same variance decomposition, but 
now to assess the importance of the growth component relative to the distribution 
component of changes in poverty.  For the sample of all spells, between one-third and 
one-half of the variation in changes in poverty is due to the growth component, with the 
remainder due to changes in distribution.  The story is quite different for the long spells, 
where the growth component of changes in poverty dominates, accounting for between 
65 and 90 percent of changes in poverty.  In both tables, the growth component is 
relatively less important for bottom-sensitive poverty measures such as the poverty gap 
and the squared poverty gap.  The middle panel in Figure 4 graphically summarizes this 
second decomposition for the long spells sample, plotting the growth component of 
changes in poverty on the vertical axis, and the sum of the growth and distribution 
components on the horizontal axis.  Again, the slope of the OLS regression line can be 
interpreted as the share of the variation on the horizontal axis due to the growth 
component.  Visually inspecting this graph, it is clear that if poverty reduction is large, it 
is mostly because the growth component of poverty reduction is large. 
 
  The bottom panel of Tables 2 and 3 further disentangles the growth component 
into growth in average incomes, and the sensitivity of poverty to growth in average 
incomes, i.e. it separates the first term in Equation (3) into its two components.  Since 
the decomposition we have been using applies to sums of random variables, I take the 
logarithm of the absolute value of the growth component, which then becomes the sum 
of the logarithm of the absolute value of growth, and the logarithm of the absolute value 
of the average sensitivity of poverty to growth, and apply the decomposition to this sum.  
Tables 2 and 3 show that over 80 percent of the cross-country variation in the growth 
component of changes in poverty is due to cross-country differences in average income 
growth, and very little is due to cross-country differences in the sensitivity of poverty to  17
average income growth.  The bottom panel of Figure 4 illustrates this, but without the log 
transform required to do the variance decomposition.  On the horizontal axis I graph the 
growth component of the change in poverty, while on the vertical axis I graph growth in 
average incomes.  While the slope of this regression cannot be interpreted as a variance 
share, it nevertheless is very clear that cross-country differences in the growth 
component of poverty are overwhelmingly accounted for by cross-country differences in 
growth.  Put differently, it is clear from this graph that if the growth component of poverty 
reduction is large, it is most likely that growth itself was large, rather than that the 
sensitivity of poverty to growth was large.
8 
 
  Two striking features of Tables 2 and 3 merit further discussion:  (a) the share of 
the variance due to growth is smaller over the short horizons represented in the dataset 
of all spells, and is larger in the dataset of long spells; and (b) in both datasets, the share 
of the variation in poverty measures due to growth declines as the poverty measures 
become more bottom-sensitive, for example when we move from the headcount to the 
poverty gap to the squared poverty gap.  We can understand these properties better with 
the help of a simple example using the EDEI poverty measure.  We can write the 
discrete proportional change in EDEI as: 
 
(6)     ( ) ) 1 ( EDEI ln ) ( EDEI ln ) 1 ( EDEI ln ) ( EDEI ln t t t t ∆ − θ ∆ + ∆ = θ ∆  
 
Recall that EDEI(1) is just average income, and that the sensitivity of EDEI to growth in 
average incomes is one.  As a result, Equation (6) is a way of writing the Datt-Ravallion 
decomposition for this measure, with the first term corresponding to the growth 
component and the second to the distribution component.  Moreover, the distributional 
change component of the change in this poverty measure corresponds to the change in 
                                                  
8 At first glance this result seems inconsistent with Ravallion (1997), who documents that the 
sensitivity of poverty to growth varies significantly with initial inequality.  However, using either 
sample of spells I can replicate the result that the interaction of growth with the initial Gini 
coefficient is significantly correlated with the change in headcount measures of poverty.  
Intuitively, the difference between the results here and those in Ravallion (1997) can be 
understood as follows:  although the interaction of growth with initial inequality is significant in 
explaining changes in poverty, it does not add much to the explanatory power of the regression in 
my samples.  Put differently, although there are cross-country differences in the sensitivity of 
poverty to growth which are significantly correlated with initial inequality, in the data these 
differences are dominated by the much larger cross-country differences in growth itself.  18




  For the purpose of this example, assume that the logarithm of household 
incomes is distributed normally with mean µt and standard deviation σt.  As the number 
of households in each country becomes large, it is straightforward to see that lnEDEI(θ) 






10  Using this result, we can write the Datt-Ravallion 














+ µ ∆ →  θ ∆  
 
Equation (7) is helpful for understanding the two key features of Tables 2 and 3 
mentioned above.  Suppose that  t µ ∆  and 
2
t σ ∆  are independent across countries.  Then 























V / V .   The further θ is from one, i.e. the more EDEI 
weights incomes of the poor (for θ<1) or the rich (for θ>1), the smaller is the share of the 
variance of change in poverty due to growth and the larger is the share due to the 
distribution component.  In other words, the more bottom-sensitive (or for that matter, 
top-sensitive), the poverty measure, the larger will be the contribution of changes in 
relative incomes to changes in the poverty measure.  This suggests an explaination why 
the share of the variance of changes in poverty due to growth declines as the poverty 
measures become more bottom-sensitive. 
 
Equation (7) is also helpful for thinking about why the share of the variance of 
changes in all poverty measures due to growth is smaller in the short run than in the long 
run.  One possible explanation is that measurement error in changes in inequality is 
                                                  
9 The Atkinson class of inequality measures is 1-EDEI(θ)/EDEI(1). 
10 This is because EDEI(θ)
1/θ is the sample average of incomes raised to the power θ.  As the 
number of households becomes large, this converges to the expectation of income raised to the 
power θ.  If incomes are lognormally distributed, we can use the moment generating function of 
the lognormal distribution to evaluate this expectation to obtain the result in the text.  19
relatively more important than measurement error in changes in average incomes when 
the period under consideration is short.  It is not clear how one might directly document 
that this is the case.  However, it is worth noting that this pattern of relative importance of 
measurement error seems quite plausible.  Suppose for example that in every period, 
log household income is measured with an additive zero-mean measurement error, 
which is independent of true incomes and is i.i.d. normal across households.  If the 
number of households is large, this zero-mean measurement error will not be reflected in 




t ξ + σ , 
where 
2
t ξ  is the variance of measurement error.  Suppose further that the variance of 
measurement error fluctuates randomly over time.  As long as the the variance of 
measurement error does not trend up or down too fast, the average annual change in 





















t  will be 
smaller the longer is the time interval, k.  While this is not conclusive, it does suggest 
that part of the reason for the relatively smaller importance of the growth component of 
changes in poverty over shorter horizons might simply be measurement error in 
household incomes. 
 
   In summary, the results in this subsection tell us that, over longer horizons, 
between 65 and 90 percent of cross-country differences in poverty changes can be 
accounted for by growth in average incomes.  Over shorter horizons the share of the 
variance of changes in poverty due to changes in growth is somewhat smaller, and 
changes in income distribution are relatively more important.  However, this may in part 
be an artifact of measurement error in individual incomes.  While there are of course 
cross-country differences in the sensitivity of poverty changes to average income 
growth, reflecting cross-country differences in the initial distribution of income, 
empirically these are relatively unimportant in understanding changes in poverty.  
Finally, although these calculations are done based on a discrete-time decomposition 
with unavoidable residuals, empirically these residuals are also small and do not detract 
from the main conclusions.   20
 
What Drives the Sources of Pro-Poor Growth? 
 
  I now turn to the question of what drives the various sources of pro-poor growth.  
In light of the results of the previous section that cross-country differences in the 
sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes are relatively unimportant, I focus 
primarily on the first and third sources of pro-poor growth:  growth in average incomes, 
and changes in relative incomes.  I measure growth in average incomes as the average 
annual growth rate over the spell of household average income or consumption.  I use 
five different measures of changes in relative incomes.  The first is simply the average 
annual change in the Gini index, for comparability with existing results on the 
determinants of changes in inequality.  The next four measures are  the discrete-time 
distribution components of the change in each of the four poverty measures I have been 
considering.  Recall that, for infinitesmal changes, the distribution component of the 
change in the headcount measures the growth rate of incomes of those at the poverty 
line relative to average growth.  For the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap, the 
distribution component measures a weighted average of relative growth rates of those 
below the poverty line, with the poverty gap giving most weight to those at the poverty 
line.  For the Watts index, the distribution component measures the average growth rate 
of those below the poverty line relative to overall growth. 
 
  There are many limitations to this dataset which make it very difficult to use it to 
identify causal determinants of growth or change in relative incomes.  The sample of 
countries is quite small, especially when we consider the long spells dataset where the 
determinants of longer-term growth and distributional change are more likely to be 
apparent.  There is also substantial measurement error in the data on growth in survey 
means, and for measures of distributional change.  While classical measurement error in 
these dependent variables will not necessarily lead to biases in coefficient estimates, it 
will inflate standard errors and reduce the significance of estimated coefficients.   
Because we have relatively few spells per country in the dataset consisting of all spells, 
and only one per country in the long spells dataset, we cannot meaningfully base 
identification on the within-country variation in the data.  This raises the possibility that 
any partial correlations we uncover may be driven by unobserved country-specific 
characteristics excluded from the regressions.  The small number of spells per country  21




In light of these difficulties,  my more modest objective here is to simply 
document the partial correlations between these sources of pro-poor growth and a 
number of right-hand-side variables of interest, and to interpret them with an appropriate 
abundance of caution.  I consider the same list of right-hand-side variables as in Dollar 
and Kraay (2002).  In that paper, we considered a small number of variables that are 
frequently found to be robustly correlated with real GDP growth in the cross-country 
growth literature: institutional quality as proxied by a measure of property rights 
protection (the “rule of law” indicator from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003)) as 
well as the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) indicator; 
openness to international trade (the constant-price local currency ratio of exports plus 
imports to GDP); inflation as a proxy for stable monetary policy (measured as the 
logarithm of one plus the CPI inflation rate);  the size of government (measured as the 
share of government consumption in GDP in local currency units); and a measure of 
financial development (the ratio of M2 to GDP in local currency units). 
 
    We also considered a number of variables that are generally less robustly 
correlated with growth, but that some studies have found to be correlated with inequality, 
either in levels or in differences.  These include a measure of democracy (the “voice and 
accountability” indicator from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003)); relative 
productivity in agriculture (measured as the ratio of value added per worker in agriculture 
relative to overall value added per worker, both in current local currency units); and 
primary educational attainment. 
 
  This list of variables is clearly not an exhaustive list of the potential determinants 
of growth in average incomes or changes in relative incomes.  However, it does provide 
us with a useful place to begin looking for the correlates of growth and distributional 
change that matter for poverty reduction.  I begin by estimating a number of very 
                                                  
11 This is of course especially problematic for the regressions below that involve a lagged 
dependent variable, which, together with unobserved country-specific effects, will make estimates 
of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable inconsistent, and can bias the coefficients on 
the other variables in different directions depending on their correlation with the lagged 
dependent variable.  22
parsimonious regressions for each of the dependent variables of interest.  I regress 
growth in average incomes on the log-level of initial period income (to pick up 
convergence effects) plus each of the control variables described above, one at a time.  I 
do the same for the change in the Gini coefficient, instead including the initial level of the 
Gini coefficient to pick up convergence in this variable.    For the remaining four 
distribution components of changes in poverty, I simply estimate univariate regressions 
of each one on each of the right-hand-side variables.
 12 
 
Table 4 shows the results using the sample of all spells, and Table 5 shows the 
same information but using only the smaller sample of long spells.  Each entry in these 
two tables corresponds to a different regression.  The rows correspond to each of the 
indicated right-hand-side variables.  The columns correspond to the different dependent 
variables.  The first two columns report regressions for growth and for the change in the 
Gini.  Both these regressions also include either initial log income or the initial Gini.  I do 
not report the coefficients on these variables to save space, but they generally enter 
negatively and usually significantly in all specificiations, consistent with available 
evidence on convergence in both of these variables.  The remaining columns report 
results for the distribution component of the change in each of the four poverty 
measures.  Recall that these measures are oriented such that a reduction corresponds 
to a reduction in poverty. 
 
A first glance at Tables 4 and 5 show that very few of the explanatory variables of 
interest are significantly correlated with the dependent variable of interest at 
conventional significance levels.  In fact, in the 108 regressions in these two tables, 
there is only one coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level, and only three that 
are significant at the 10 percent level.  One possible explanation for the lack of 
significant results is that the measures of growth and distributional change on the right-
hand-side are contaminated by substantial measurement error.  It is difficult to judge 
however by how much standard errors should be adjusted to reflect this measurement 
                                                  
12 Ravallion (2001) documents the empirical importance of inequality convergence using the Gini 
coefficient.  I have experimented with alternative initial inequality measures in the regressions 
involving the distributional change components of the various poverty measures, but I find that 
none are robustly significant.  23
error.
13  Rather than try to assess the statistical significance of the partial correlations 
documented in Tables 4 and 5, I simply describe some of the qualitative patterns that 
emerge.    
 
Consider first institutional quality, as proxied by the rule of law indicator.  This 
tends to be positively correlated with growth, but also positively correlated with each of 
the measures of distributional change, suggesting that distributional change tends to 
raise poverty in countries with good institutional quality.  However, the strength of the 
correlation with growth is much larger than the correlations with distributional change:  
the t-statistic from the growth regression is about twice the average t-statistic for the 
different measures of distributional change.  The voice and accountability measure 
follows the same pattern, likely because it is quite highly correlated with rule of law in 
this sample. 
 
In the case of openess to international trade, the correlation with growth is 
generally stronger than the correlations with distributional change.  Moreover, the sign of 
the correlation with each of the measures of distributional change is negative, indicating 
that distributional change tends to be poverty-reducing in countries that trade more.  
Inflation tends to be extremely weakly correlated with growth in this sample, and tends to 
be positively correlated with distributional change, but again the correlation is very weak.  
Government consumption is negatively correlated with growth, but interestingly is also 
negatively correlated with each of the measures of distributional change, suggesting that 
distributional change tends to be pro-poor in countries with larger governments.  
Financial development also appears to be very weakly correlated with either growth or 
distributional change in these regressions. 
 
  Relative productivity in agriculture is essentially uncorrelated with growth, but 
tends to be positively correlated with distributional change measures.  Somewhat 
surprisingly the sign of the correlation suggests that countries with higher relative 
productivity in agriculture are more likely to experience poverty-increasing changes in 
relative incomes.  Finally, primary education is also virtually uncorrelated with growth, 
                                                  
13 In Table 4, there is an additional factor which likely biases standard errors upward.  For 
countries with multiple spells of growth or distributional change, there is likely to be by 
construction a negative correlation between the errors of successive spells.  Correcting for this 
will likely reduce standard errors somewhat.  24
and also is essentially uncorrelated with most of the distributional change measures, 
with the exception of the Gini in the long spells regression. 
 
  Overall, while most of the partial correlations documented in Tables 4 and 5 are 
not statistically significant, the qualitative pattern suggests that there may be some 
tradeoffs.  Rule of law is positively correlated with growth but also with poverty-
increasing shifts in relative incomes.  The opposite is true for government consumption.  
In contrast trade is positively correlated with growth and with poverty-reducing shifts in 
relative incomes.  In Table 6 we examine these possible tradeoffs in a slightly richer 
empirical specification, using the dataset of long spells.  We begin by estimating a more 
fully-specified growth regression with initial income, and initial values of institutional 
quality, trade openness, and size of government as right-hand-side variables.  Despite 
the likely noisiness of the data, it is possible to find plausible specifications in which 
some of the determinants of growth from the growth literature are also significantly 
correlated with growth in the household survey mean.  The first column of Table 6 
illustrates one such regression, which includes initial income, institutional quality, trade 
openness, and government consumption on the right-hand-side.  Each of these 
variables enters with signs consistent with the broader growth literature.  Initial income 
enters negatively, picking up convergence effects.  Institutional quality and trade are 
both positively correlated with growth, and larger government size is associated with 
slower growth.  I do not want to claim that these results are a robust feature of this 
particular dataset.  However, the results are broadly consistent with the findings of the 
empirical growth literature, which uses per capita GDP growth rates for a much larger 
sample of countries, and so it seems reasonable to focus on this particular specification. 
 
  In the second column of Table 6, I show the same regression, but instead using 
the change in the Gini coefficient as the dependent variable.  None of the correlates of 
growth are significantly correlated with changes in this summary statistic of inequality.  It 
is however difficult to move from the results in these first two columns to conclusions 
about the effects on poverty, without making restrictive assumptions on the shape of 
income distributions.  Since I have already constructed the growth and distribution 
components of changes in poverty, I can simply use these as dependent variables to 
investigate how these correlates of growth matter for changes in poverty.  The remaining 
four columns of Table 6 do this for the headcount and for the Watts index.  Given the  25
high correlation between the growth components of poverty changes and average 
income growth documented above, it is not surprising that the regressions for the growth 
components of poverty are very similar to the growth regression in the first column.  
Institutional quality, trade, and government size are significantly correlated with the 
growth components of changes in these two poverty measures, although the 
significance is slightly less than before.  In contrast, I find very little evidence that any of 
these three variables are significantly correlated with the distribution component of 
changes in poverty.  The only exception is institutional quality, which is significant at the 
10 percent level in the headcount distribution component regression.  The sign indicates 
that poverty-increasing distributional change is more likely to occur in countries with 
better institutional quality. 
 
  Despite the general insignificance of the distributional change regressions, it is 
interesting to quantify the relative magnitudes of the estimated coefficients as well.  
Since the observed change in poverty is essentially equal to the sum of the growth and 
distribution components (with a relatively unimportant residual as we have seen), the 
overall effect on poverty of each of these variables is just the sum of the two coefficients.  
Figure 5 graphically illustrates the growth and distribution effects of these variables on 
poverty as measured by the headcount.   For Rule of Law, the growth effect lowers 
poverty, while the distribution effect raises it.  The overall net effect is negative, however, 
since the growth effect is larger in absolute value than the distribution effect.  For trade, 
both the growth and distribution effects reduce poverty, with a much larger growth effect.  
Finally, the growth and distribution effects work in opposite directions for government 
size, again with the adverse growth effect dominating the smaller poverty-reducing 
distribution effect. 
 
     26
Conclusions 
 
  What do we learn from all of this?  I have used standard decomposition 
techniques to identify three potential sources of pro-poor growth:  (a) a high rate of 
growth of average incomes;  (b) a high sensitivity of poverty to growth in average 
incomes; and (c) a poverty-reducing pattern of growth in relative incomes.  Empirically 
implementing these decompositions for a large sample of changes in poverty, we have 
seen that only the first and third sources of pro-poor growth are empirically relevant.  
Moreover, in the medium to long run, cross-country differences in growth in average 
incomes are the dominant factor explaining changes in poverty.  Together, these 
decomposition results indicate that the search for pro-poor growth should begin by 
focusing on determinants of growth in average incomes.  At some level, this is an 
encouraging conclusion, because we have by now a large body of empirical results on 
the policies and institutions that drive growth in average incomes. 
 
Nevertheless, the empirical results shown here on the correlates of growth and 
distributional change are rather unsatisfactory.  Most of the simple correlations between 
these dependent variables and a number of right-hand-side variables of interest are 
quite far from significant at conventional levels, although the balance of the evidence 
seems to suggest that the correlations with growth are on average somewhat more 
significant than the correlations with distributional change. It is possible to find 
multivariate specifications for growth in survey means over longer horizons that yield 
sensible results consistent with the empirical growth literature.  At most, this provides 
some comfort that the results on partial correlates of growth in survey mean income 
documented here are more broadly robust and may even have causal interpretations.  
However, there is much more to be learned about why per capita GDP growth, whose 




In contrast, in this sample it is difficult to find significant correlates of either 
changes in summary statistics of inequality such as the Gini, or distributional shifts that 
matter for a variety of poverty measures of interest such as the ones I have constructed 
here.  Moreover, some of the partial correlations with distributional change documented 
                                                  
14 See for example Deaton (2003) for a discussion of some of the relevant issues.  27
here do not appear to be consistent with those uncovered in other papers.  For example, 
a number of papers have found that increased openness increases summary measures 
of inequality, at least in low-income countries (Barro (2000), Lundberg and Squire 
(2003), Milanovic (2003)).  In contrast Dollar and Kraay (2002) find no correlation at all 
between several measures of openness and income distribution, with and without 
several interactions.  The results here, although not very significant, consistently show 
that more open countries are more likely to see poverty-reducing shifts in income 
distribution.  This wide range of signs and significance of results from the cross-country 
literature should caution us against drawing particularly strong conclusions about the 
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Table 1:  Correlations of Poverty Measures and  
Survey Mean Income or Consumption 
 
Levels Growth Rates
All Spells (128 Observations)
Headcount -0.842 -0.590
Poverty Gap -0.727 -0.519
Squared Poverty Gap -0.615 -0.472
Watts -0.647 -0.489
Long Spells (42 Observations)
Headcount -0.935 -0.717
Poverty Gap -0.722 -0.672








Table 2:  Decomposing Changes in Poverty:  All Spells 
 
Growth, Distribution and Residual Components of Change in Poverty:  dP = G + D + R
Growth and Distribution Components vs Residual (G+D vs R)
V(G+D) V(R) COV(G+D,R) Share of Variance Due to G+D
Headcount 0.0284 0.0008 -0.0004 0.9859
Poverty Gap 0.0485 0.0010 -0.0004 0.9877
Squared Poverty Gap 0.0702 0.0013 -0.0007 0.9914
Watts 0.0599 0.0010 -0.0005 0.9917
Growth vs Distribution Components (G vs D)
V(G) V(D) COV(G,D) Share of Variance Due to G
Headcount 0.0168 0.0173 -0.0029 0.4912
Poverty Gap 0.0216 0.0334 -0.0033 0.3781
Squared Poverty Gap 0.0255 0.0517 -0.0035 0.3134
Watts 0.0231 0.0435 -0.0033 0.3300
Average Growth and Sensitivity to Average Growth in Growth Component:  ln|G| = ln|dlnµ| + ln|η|
V(|dlnµ|) V(|η|) COV(|dlnµ|,|η|) Share of Variance Due to |dlnµ|
Headcount 1.1290 0.1577 0.1436 0.8086
Poverty Gap 1.1089 0.1311 0.1202 0.8302
Squared Poverty Gap 1.1073 0.1369 0.1224 0.8259





Table 3:  Decomposing Changes in Poverty:  Long Spells 
 
Growth, Distribution and Residual Components of Change in Poverty:  dP = G + D + R
Growth and Distribution Components vs Residual (G+D vs R)
V(G+D) V(R) COV(G+D,R) Share of Variance Due to G+D
Headcount 0.0064 0.0005 -0.0004 0.9836
Poverty Gap 0.0120 0.0008 -0.0010 1.0185
Squared Poverty Gap 0.0181 0.0011 -0.0017 1.0380
Watts 0.0148 0.0009 -0.0011 1.0148
Growth vs Distribution Components (G vs D)
V(G) V(D) COV(G,D) Share of Variance Due to G
Headcount 0.0077 0.0024 -0.0018 0.9077
Poverty Gap 0.0106 0.0046 -0.0016 0.7500
Squared Poverty Gap 0.0129 0.0073 -0.0010 0.6538
Watts 0.0116 0.0063 -0.0015 0.6779
Average Growth and Sensitivity to Average Growth in Growth Component:  ln|G| = ln|dlnµ| + ln|η|
V(|dlnµ|) V(|η|) COV(|dlnµ|,|η|) Share of Variance Due to |dlnµ|
Headcount 1.3228 0.1642 0.1402 0.8278
Poverty Gap 1.2836 0.1492 0.1131 0.8419
Squared Poverty Gap 1.2765 0.1527 0.1114 0.8401






Table 4:  Correlates of Pro-Poor Growth:  All Spells 
 
Dependent Variable Is:
Distribution Component of Change in:
Growth Change in Gini P0 P1 P2 Watts # Obs
RHS Variable is:
CPIA 0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 121
0.920 0.160 0.477 0.354 0.310 0.360
KK Rule of Law 0.012 0.002 0.016 0.019 0.023 0.019 128
1.339 0.292 0.766 0.674 0.633 0.568
Trade/GDP 0.017 -0.017 -0.034 -0.038 -0.041 -0.041 126
1.120 1.431 0.990 0.805 0.692 0.757
ln(1+Inflation) 0.001 0.006 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.037 116
0.059 0.323 0.790 0.566 0.449 0.474
Government -0.154 -0.053 -0.421 -0.488 -0.507 -0.532 125
Consumption/GDP 1.206 0.515 1.539 1.250 1.041 1.192
M2/GDP 0.015 -0.008 -0.024 -0.013 -0.002 -0.010 124
0.638 0.431 0.475 0.182 0.028 0.130
KK Voice and 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 128
Accountability 0.294 0.891 0.194 0.150 0.153 0.086
Relative Productivity -0.005 0.017 0.053 0.060 0.065 0.061 126
in Agriculture 0.271 1.200 1.324 1.106 0.969 0.994
Average Years of 0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 101
Primary Education 0.538 0.649 0.534 0.477 0.410 0.576
 




Table 5:  Correlates of Pro-Poor Growth:  Long Spells 
 
Dependent Variable Is:
Distribution Component of Change in:
Growth Change in Gini P0 P1 P2 Watts # Obs
RHS Variable is:
CPIA 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.005 40
0.555 0.267 0.143 0.282 0.336 0.315
KK Rule of Law 0.024 0.007 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.020 42
1.726 0.950 1.583 1.100 0.861 0.864
Trade/GDP 0.035 -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 -0.019 -0.015 42
1.656 0.497 0.364 0.441 0.482 0.423
ln(1+Inflation) -0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.023 -0.038 -0.031 39
0.073 0.258 0.196 0.681 0.896 0.778
Government -0.110 -0.033 -0.225 -0.278 -0.327 -0.327 42
Consumption/GDP 0.742 0.421 1.526 1.350 1.256 1.357
M2/GDP -0.028 -0.016 -0.053 -0.048 -0.045 -0.045 42
0.663 0.722 1.205 0.783 0.572 0.618
KK Voice and 0.021 0.008 0.013 0.011 0.101 0.009 42
Accountability 1.659 1.231 1.049 0.646 0.462 0.438
Relative Productivity 0.013 0.021 0.044 0.050 0.054 0.056 42
in Agriculture 0.543 1.388 1.513 1.277 1.105 1.217
Average Years of -0.001 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.006 32
Primary Education 0.063 2.601 0.638 0.521 0.558 0.475
 




Table 6:  Multivariate Growth and Distributional Change Regressions 
 
Annual Percent Change in: Annual Percent Change in Headcount Annual Percent Change in Watts Index
Survey Mean Gini Growth Distribution Growth Distribution
Component Component Component Component
Initial Income -0.017 -0.008 0.037 -0.018 0.040 -0.023
1.978 1.470 1.769 1.409 1.577 1.284
KK Rule of Law 0.022 0.009 -0.046 0.029 -0.049 0.029
2.050 0.919 2.188 1.785 2.108 1.221
Trade/GDP 0.045 -0.011 -0.060 -0.007 -0.077 -0.011
1.978 0.911 1.659 0.361 1.667 0.310
Government -0.280 -0.048 0.600 -0.244 0.667 -0.330
Consumption 2.229 0.425 2.114 1.010 2.124 1.175
R-Squared 0.239 0.095 0.263 0.182 0.222 0.103
# Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
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Figure 4:  Decomposing Changes in the Headcount 
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Figure 5:  Policies and the Growth and Distribution Components  
of Changes in Policy 
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